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The strategic group concept provides an attractive middle ground hetween firm and itiditsiry
for both theory development and empirical analysis. To date, this concept has been defined
by researchers in terms of secondary accounting and financial data, and a number of critics
have questioned the validity of this work. Our research shows that industry participants
share perceptions about strategic commonalities among firms, and thai participants cluster
competitors in subtle ways not reflected in extant academic research on .strategic groups.
Decision makers' perceptions and cognitions are phenomena that can be expected to
influence industry evolution. They are of research interest as an additional source of data
on firm commonalities which helps address concerns about previous strategic group research.
In 1972 Hunt introduced the term 'strategic
group' to describe the 'symmetry of operations'
he observed In the appliance industry. Hunt
noted significant differences in characteristics
and strategies among the firms in his study, while
at the same time he found that many firms
followed similar strategies. Grouping firms clari-
fied understanding of the apparently viable
strategic options in the industry.
Although no formal definition is universally
accepted, a 'strategic group' continues to be
commonly defined as a group of firms within the
same industry making similar decisions in key
areas (Porter, 1980: 129). If these possibilities
are thought of as an n-dimensional graph,
strategic groups identify clusters of firms in
'strategic space,' and group membership defines
the essential characteristics of a firm's strategy.
The identification of strategic groups has been
used primarily to explore systematic differences
in profitability among firms in the same industry
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(McGee and Thomas, 1986). The strategic groups
area is quite active and continues to generate
numerous studies. Table 1 summarizes the main
studies published since the McGee and Thomas
(1986) review.
Recent reviewers, however, have voiced several
frustrations with the state of strategic group
theory and empirical research (Barney and
Hoskisson, 1990; Cool. 1985; Hatten and Hatten,
1987; McGee and Thomas, 1986; Thomas and
Venkatraman, 1988). Dissatisfactions include
insufficient theoretic underpinnings for the con-
struct itself, inadequate model specification,
haphazard selection of strategic dimensions used
to form groups, and inconclusive results from
empirical research. Given these serious concerns,
it is essential that we step back from research in
this area to examine fundamental questions about
the strategic group concept.
The most recent and potentially most devastat-
ing attack on strategic group research has been
made by Barney and Hoskisson (1990). who
claim that two critical assertions of strategic
group theory remain untested: '(1) that strategic
groups exist and (2) that a firm s performance
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Table 1. Recent strategic groups studies
Study Industry Primary dala type
Cool and Schendel (1987)
Fombrun and Zajac (1987)
Hatten and Hatten (1987)
Johnson and Thomas (1987)
Cool and Schendel (1988)
Lawless, Bergh and Wilsted
(1989)
Lawless and Finch (1989)
Mascarenhas (1989)
Mascarenhas and Aaker (1989)
McNamee and McHugh (1989)
Zajac and Shortell (1989)
Barney and Hoskisson (1990)
Fiegcnbaum and Thomas (1990)
Kumar. Thomas and Fiegenbaum
(1990)
Lewis and Thomas (1990)
Porac and Thomas (1990)
Schroeder (1990)
Ulrich and McKelvey (1990)
Boeker (1991)
Lawless and Tegarden (1991)
Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991)
Sudharshan. Thomas and
Ficaenbaum (1991)
Tallman (1991)
Caves and Ghemawat (1992)
pharmaceutical
financial services
U.K. brewing
pharmaceutical
manufacturing firms
52 manufacturing finns
oil-well drilling
oil-weli drilling
Northern Ireland clothing industry
hospitals
insurance
U.K. retail grocery
foundry
Japanese electronics
brewing
47 four-digit SIC
automobile
pharmaceutical
automobile
variety from PIMS NRDB database
archival
survey questionnaire
validated with archival
conceptual
archival
archival
archival
archival
archival
archival
archival
questionnaire
conceptual
archival
conceptual
archival
conceptual
interviews
multiple case studies
archival
archival
archival
archival
archival
archival
archival
depends upon strategic group membership' (1990:
187). Further, the assumption '[t]hat there are
groups of firms suggests that firms are not
idiosyncratic in strategically relevant ways'
(Barney and Hoskisson, 1990: 188). Strategic
group research is also suspect, since, to date,
groups have been defined using 'an almost
standard method. . .[which[ employs some form
of cluster or factor analysis' (Barney and Hoskis-
son. 1990: 189). Hatten and Hatten support this
basic challenge with the assertion that strategic
groups are merely analytical conveniences used
by researchers, artifacts of our theories and
techniques, without any objective analogue in
the natural environment (1987: 329).
Our view is, first, that strategic groups can
be defined in a way that allows some strategically
important variance among firms within each
group. This view is supported by results
presented in this paper. Second, although the
explanation of performance differences among
firms is clearly elusive (Cool and Schendel,
1988; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990; McGee
and Thomas. 1986). we believe a modified
theory of group structure, along lines developed
later in this paper, may still make a contribution
to the understanding of profitable strategic
choices. Predicting firm profitability, however,
is not the key contribution of a cognitive
approach to strategic groups.
Even if strategic groups are found to be
uncorrelated with performance outcomes, our
position is that managerial perception of similari-
ties and differences among competitors influence
strategic decision making, and thus are worthy
of study. In fact, strategists' grouping schemes
may prove to be more significant than researcher-
defined groupings for understanding competition
and performance because, through enactment
processes (Weick, 1979), the way firms see
themselves and their competitors (Porac. Thomas,
and Emme. 1987) is expected to have tangible
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effects on strategy reformulation and subsequent
industry structure.
It seems logical that strategists will think in
terms of clusters of competitors to cognitively
simplify a complex environment, Commonalities
among firms should also be expected, indepen-
dent of individual precepts, as a result of broader
pressures creating institutional isomorphism
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and because ofthe
many inertia factors inhibiting strategic change
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Recent work on
isomorphism and inertia (Powell and DiMaggio.
1991) have bolstered our understanding of why
firms do not always achieve the kind of idiosyn-
cratic positions Barney and Hoskisson (1990)
rightly indicate are often associated with competi-
tive advantage.
Finally, though we will make the argument
that perceptual and economic factors can
reinforce each other, fundamental questions
about the real and the perceived cannot be
answered definitively by any research endeavor.
The demise of logical positivist standards make
even simple assertions such as "the sun will rise
tomorrow' unprovable (Kuhn, 1970). As all
proofs become suspect, no research project can
satisfactorily say it has identified anything that
is objectively "real.* The study reported here
focuses on determining if strategists perceive
differentiating commonalities among firms and if
so, to outline the nature of those perceptions. If
groups of firms are 'real' for strategists, then
research at the strategic group level is much
more important than if groups are only the result
of researchers" analytical exercises. Empirical
evidence using strategists as data sources also
provides multimethod confirmation (Huff, 1982;
Jick, 1979) for extant research using archival
sources.
In this paper, we summarize research from
cognitive psychology, organization theory and
strategy that supports two propositions. These
propositions, that strategists will perceive simi-
larities among subgroups of firms in an industry
and that strategists in the same industry will
group participants in that industry in similar
ways, are examined with data from the Chicago
banking industry. The data show a shared sense
of group structure in the industry, but also reveal
a range of agreement on the similarity of
firm strategies. These subtleties in executive
perceptions add important dimensions to the
strategic group concept and increase its potential
utility for understanding competitive positioning.
To foreshadow points elaborated upon in the
concluding sections of the paper, we believe
those interested in describing and explaining
strategic group structure might well amplify
results from archival studies with cognitive
studies. Those interested in predicting change in
strategic position may be even more dependent
on cognitive data to extend retrospective financial
and accounting data.
STRATEGIC GROUPS AS THE RESULT
OF PERCEPTION AND COGNITION
Strategic management research is just beginning
to assess the importance of cognitive frameworks
in strategic decision processes (Dutton. Fahey,
and Narayanan, 1983; Huff, 1990; Mason and
Mitroff. 1981; Stubhart, 1986, 19S7). Porac and
Thomas' (1990) recent theoretical paper examines
many of the cognitive rationales for mental models
of competition. Two reasons why managers in
demanding competitive situations might focus on
groups of firms rather than individual competitors
deserve special note.
Simplification
Cognitive research suggests that simpliftcation is
a cognitive necessity in cases of information
overload. Research also shows that human beings
can be easily overloaded. Miller (1956), for
example, found that people cannot hold more
than about seven bits of data in mind at a time.
Work on cognitive simplification processes among
managers (e.g., Schwenk, 1984; Simon, 1945)
suggests that strategists simplify the complex
cognitive problem of independently analyzing a
large number of competitors by grouping them.
In fact, executives, journalists and industry
analysts often refer to groups of firms in public
statements.
Elaboration
Cognitive elaboration involves filling in gaps
(often unconsciously) when interpreting stimuli.
The theoretical rationale for this activity is
precisely the opposite of that offered for simplifi-
cation. Sometimes data are not rich or varied
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enough to allow interpretation without further
elaboration. Often unconsciously, the unknowns
about a particular case are likely to be filled in
with information consistent with beliefs about
other, better known examples that are believed
to be similar (Rosch, 1981).
Prahatad and Bettis (1986) have given a
compelling example of this kind of embellishment.
They propose that managers make acquisitions
and divestments on the basis of a 'dominant
logic' or dominant paradigm developed through
past experience. The result is a consistency in
firm decisions over time, despite a wide variety
of acquisition opportunities. We submit that
executive perceptions may similarly 'gel' with
respect to the dominant logic ascribed to sur-
rounding firms. It is possible that these attributes
go beyond the deliberate intentions of the
companies involved, but the practical result is
increased facility with the difficult problems of
complex analysis.
While simplification and elaboration are very
different responses to competitive conditions, an
important result of both processes, we suggest,
is that strategists will perceive similarities among
firms. Our first proposition, then, based on both
cognitive simplification and elaboration is that:
Strategists^ perceptions of their competitors'
strategies will be characterized by a group
structure, rather than each firm's strategy being
perceived as unique or all firms' strategies
being perceived as similar.
Interaction
While cognitive simplification and cognitive elab-
oration could lead to totally idiosyncratic group-
ings, strategists who work in the same industry
environment are expected to develop shared
perceptions of the competitive environment over
time. Company executives interact with each
other at industry associations and other gather-
ings; they share similar sources of information
sueh as trade publications; they hire from the
same professional labor pool and frequently
employ the same consultants. As events shape
the industry, such commonalities in information
sources encourage shared interpretation of the
present and shared expectations for the future,
including shared perspectives on industry group-
ings (Huff, 1982; Porac, Thomas, and Baden-
FuIIer, 1989). Thus, based on arguments of
shared information sources and interaction, we
further propose that:
Strategic group structure will be widely shared
by strategists within an industry, rather than
each strategist holding unique perceptions of
strategic group structure.
COGNITIVE STRUCTURES
Given the potential importance of participant
perspectives on the competitive environment, we
believe that inquiry on strategic groups should
include research based on cognitive data. This
work appropriately begins with tests of the
existence of competitor groupings in the minds of
strategists. Previous research has made important
first steps in this direction (Dess and Davis, 1984;
Fombrun and Zajac, 1987). These researchers'
purpose was to measure managerial perceptions
of theoretically significant constructs, not to
uncover cognitive structure perse. Questionnaires
were used to gather data in these studies, and
therefore it is not clear if the competitor
groups found represent the respondents' cognitive
structure of the industry or a structure inherent
in the instruments used (Fransella and Bannister,
1977).
Two streams of research in cognitive psychology
are particularly appropriate for overcoming this
problem in studies of cognitive structure Including
the study of cognitive strategic groups. Classifi-
cation theories concentrate on categories of
concepts and the hierarchical relationships among
them (Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977: 169-253;
Lakoff, 1987; Rosch, 1978). Alternatively, per-
sona! construct theory (Kelly, 1955; Fransella
and Bannister, 1977) focuses on the dimensions
of concepts. The research reported here draws
primarily on personal construct theory, which is
especially germane given that extant strategic
group theory assumes variation among firms
along key dimensions of decision making (Porter,
198(); Cool and Schendel. 1987; Porac and
Thomas. 1990) just as personal construct theory
concentrates on the key dimensions, or constructs,
of human cognition (Kelly, 1955). In addition,
Thomas and Venkatraman (1988) advocated the
use of this approach in their review of strategic
groups research.
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Personal construct theory was first postulated as
a theory of personality (Kelly, 1955); but later
adherents assign it a more limited role as a theory
of cognition (Fransella and Bannister, 1977).
Briefly, the theory posits that bipolar constructs (or
dimensions) are the primary mechanism individuals
use to organize, simplify, and interpret the mass
of stimuli that constantly confront them. Constructs
are defined in terms of similarities and differences
and are organized into systems of meaning which
individuals use to develop theories about the
environment, to make predictions and guide action.
Personal construct theory is predicated on the
belief that individuals act on their perceptions
of the objective world filtered through their
constructive system. The individual does not
passively perceive the environment, rather he or
she actively construes (attaches meaning to)
perceptions. Kelly suggests that it is relatively
easy for an individual to move an object along
a cognitive construct, but much more difficult to
think of objects in terms that are not part of an
existing construct system. Constructs are thus seen
to form a somewhat flexible yet structured network
that both facilitates and restricts an individual's
perceptions and actions (Kelly, 1955: 49).
Hundreds of studies have been published In
psychology and related fields using personal
construct theory (Fransella and Bannister, 1977),
but application of the theory and its related
methodology, repertory grid technique, is quite
new to strategic management. Ginsberg (1987)
and his colleagues (Dunn et al. 1986; Dunn and
Ginsberg, 1986) have recommended the theory
and methodology for the study of business and
public policy issues. Empirical studies are limited,
but initial studies illustrate the flexibility of its
application. Eden. Jones, and Sims (1979; 1983)
combined personal construct theory with causal
mapping to help organization members clarify
and alter their perceptions of management
situations. Walton (1986) built profiles of proto-
typical successful and unsuccessful firms using
the repertory grid technique and Dutton (1987)
studied the dimensions managers use to categorize
issues with the same method.
RESEARCH DESIGN
We used personal construct theory to address
the research questions of this study. First, do
strategists group competitors in an industry?
Second, are perceptions of competitor groupings
widely shared or are they idiosyncratic? The two
propositions were examined in the context of
U.S. banking industry—a quite demanding test
site, given that recent changes in regulation and
increased competition might be expected to make
clusters of competitors less stable and more
difficult to assess.
The research focused on the competitive
strategies of the 18 largest bank holding compa-
nies (BHCs) headquartered in the Chicago area
between 1982 and 1985 (Table 2). This time
frame was chosen because it was bracketed by
major regulatory changes in Illinois. In 1982,
Illinois bank holding companies were allowed to
acquire additional banks. Previous to this date,
Illinois was a unit banking state, meaning that a
bank holding company could only own one bank.
Beginning in July, 1985, Illinois passed a regional,
reciprocal banking pack with other midwestern
states. Both of these changes were expected to
increase the rate of environmental change and
facilitate major strategic repositioning in the
banking industry. While all 18 firms were not
necessarily direct competitors in all markets when
interviews were conducted in 1986. we expected,
and found, that most strategists would be aware
of the total population of major firms under
these circumstances.
Interviews were conducted at 6 ofthe 18 BHCs
in the study population. The six were chosen for
their diversity, relying on industry observers not
in the study and secondary sources. Two firms
were widely touted as well run, two were
financially troubled and two had mixed perform-
ance reviews from industry insiders. Two of the
banks were located 'in the loop,' two were in
other downtown locations, and two were thought
of as suburban banks. Two of the BHCs owned
a single large 'flagship' bank, one was clearly
organized as a multibank confederation. Interest-
ingly, at least four of the six banks were rumored
to be acquisition oriented, while five of the six
were rumored to be takeover candidates.
All six firms chosen for the sample agreed to
participate in the study. The CEO at each bank
identified five strategic decision makers within
the firm who were especially familiar with
competition in the Chicago market from 1982
through 1985. Four of the six CEOs personally
participated in the study. In all, 30 strategists
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were contacted and 23 provided usable data for
a 77% participation rate.
All Informants for the study were experienced
bankers. They were employed in the banking
industry for an average of 18.5 years, with
banking experience ranging from 10 to 35 years.
Respondents had worked for their current firm
for an average of 10.25 years. Their experience
varied widely, with seven (30%) in general
management, five (22%) in finance, three (13%)
in strategic or corporate planning and one (4%)
in marketing. Seven of the informants worked
in major product areas, including two (9%) in
commercial loans, two (9%) in retail or private
banking and one each in correspondent banking,
financial institutions and trust (4% each).
Data collection
Data were collected in Fall 1986 via semistruc-
tured interviews using the minimum context form
of the repertory grid technique (Dunn and
Ginsberg, 1986; Fransella and Bannister, 1977;
Kelly, 1955; Reger, 1990b). This technique
requires each informant to generate personal
dimensions for describing the phenomenon of
study and to make similarity and difference
judgments about individual examples of that
phenomenon along those dimensions only. Thus,
researcher-imposed structure on subject cognition
Is minimized.
Bach informant in the study was interviewed
separately. Following standard procedures for
the minimum context format, the 18 BHCs'
names were presented to each Informant three
at a time. The sequence of presentation of triads
was random and the same for each informant.
Informants were asked the way or ways in which
two of the BHCs were more similar strategically
and how the third was different. In this way,
bipolar dimensions used by strategists to differen-
tiate among the strategies of competitors were
elicited.
Each informant personally identified dimen-
sions, which were then used to elicit judgement
about competitors" strategies. Ideally, informants
would rate each focal BHC along all the
dimensions they personally use to distinguish
competitors. However, pretests indicated that
asking an individual to rate all 18 BHCs along
all defining dimensions was infeasible because of
the time involved; pretest subjects reported their
Table 2. Number and percentage of informants who assigned
each fociil bank holding company to each cluster
First Chicago
Northern Trust
Continental [11.
Harris
ABN-LaSalle
Exchange
First Evergreen
Gary Wheaton
Affiliated
Firs! United
USA meri banes
State National
First Illinois
First Colonial
Cole-Taylor
Boulevard
Lake Shore
Unibancorp
Cluster 1
No.
18
17
17
16
It
8
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
I
2
4
4
%
100
100
l(X)
100
79
67
i7
7
10
13
29
24
27
Cluster 2
No.
0
0
0
0
0
2
15
16
9
14
13
9
10
n
11
6
6
2
%
17
100
100
100
93
93
90
90
80
73
43
35
18
Cluster 3
No.
0
0
0
0
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
I
2
4
7
6
%
21
17
10
9
10
13
29
41
55
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boredom level rose substantially when so many
ratings were required. Therefore, each informant
was randomly assigned to one of four groups to
rate an overlapping subsample of 12 of the 18
focal BHCs. This sampling procedure, commonly
used in marketing (Green. 1977). allowed for
comparisons across informants without each
informant rating all BHCs.
Each informant rated the BHCs along his (all
subjects were male) self-supplied dimensions
using 11 point scales. The procedure yielded
23 n X m rating grids, one for each informant,
where n is the number of dimensions elicited for
each of the 23 informants and m represents the
number of firms the informant felt knowledgeable
assessing. The Appendix provides a sample of
the elicited dimensions. Detailed dimension-level
results of this research also are reported elsewhere
(Reger and Palmer. 1990).
Data analysis
It is possible to ask informants to directly form
groups by sorting the population into subsets, a
variant of repertory grid technique called the full
context form (Fransella and Bannister. 1977: 15).
This sorting task was rejected for two reasons.
First, extant strategic group theory is both
theoretically and empirically concerned with the
dimensionality of competitive strategy; that is.
how firms are positioned in multidimensional
competitive space. Therefore, we employed
procedures which mirrored current research
practice. Second, most applications of personal
construct theory have used the minimum context
form and, thus, reliability and validity measures
have been better established for this procedure
(Fransella and Bannister. 1977).
Instead of directly asking informants for their
perceived groupings, we cluster analyzed each
informant's rating grid using SAS CLUSTER.
Cluster analysis particularly fits the objectives of
this study, since it places objects into groups
suggested by the data. Clustering techniques can
be criticized, however, since by their nature they
will break the data available into subsets,
however weak the association among data points.
Therefore, three clustering methods were
employed, each of which has been found to have
somewhat different strengths and weaknesses. If
all three clustering methods give similar results
using multiple criteria, confidence that the groups
are an inherent part of the data and not an
artifact of the particular clustering algorithm is
increased.
The first clustering technique used, the average
linkage algorithm, forms clusters on the basis of
the average distance between pairs of obser-
vations. This method 'tends to join clusters with
small variances and is slightly biased toward
producing clusters with the same variance' (SAS,
1985: 263). The second, centroid method maxi-
mizes the distance between group means, recom-
puting the centroids each time a new observation
is included in a cluster. This method 'is more
robust to outliers than most other hierarchical
methods' (SAS, 1985: 264). Ward's method was
used as a third alternative. Groups are formed
by minimizing the within cluster ANOVA sum
of squares. With this technique Ward's cluster
analysis 'tends to join clusters with a small
number of observations and is strongly biased
toward producing clusters with roughly the same
number of observations' (SAS, 1985: 267).
Cluster analysis is not an inferential statistical
technique in which the researcher can link a
specified confidence level with a set of clusters
(Everitt. 1980: 66); instead, the researcher must
specify rules for choosing the number of clusters
that will be used for description and analysis of
the data. Three decision rules determined the
number of clusters from each algorithm's output
for each informant's data: adopt cluster solutions
at large breaks in the dendrograms, avoid cluster
solutions that produce one firm groups, and
choose solutions with high interpretability based
on qualitative comments made by informants
(Everitt, 1980; Hartigan, 1975; Romesburg,
1984). As a further assurance that the clusters
represented 'real" groups in the data and not
simply artifacts of the methods, the first author
applied the decision rules to the average linkage
output, while the second author independently
evaluated the centroid and Ward's results. Use
of these decision rules was considered preferable
to blind application of any one decision rule that
might misrepresent the data (Everitt, 1980:
Romesburg. 1984).
As a test of the correspondence between
strategic groups identified by industry participants
and economic 'reality,' we then looked at two
outcome indicators. Data on profitability and
survival, independent variables of longstanding
interest in strategy research, were gathered on
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the 18 firms in the study. Profitability data were
gathered in 1986. Though mergers made it
impossible to compare profitability in subsequent
years, the merger pattern itself provides an
interesting applieation of strategic groupings.
RESULTS
Individual results
The decision criteria outlined above yielded
either two or three eluster solutions in the data
from all but one of the 23 respondents, for whom
only one of the three clustering algorithms
yielded a cluster solution, the other two did not.
This informant, however, only felt comfortable
ranking 6 of the 12 BHCs presented, and these
BHCs were most often clustered together by
other resp<indents. For 17of the other informants,
the cluster results from the three methods
converged. In one of the remaining five cases,
one method created a group where ihe other
two did not. In a second instance, one procedure
did not create a group where the other two did.
Two other cases involved one mismatch among
the three methods out of the 12 firms the
respondents answered, and a third involved 2
out of 12 discrepancies among the three methods.
The fact that three algorithms yielded exactly
the same clusters in data from 17 of 23 informants
(74%) and that the worst case involved only a
16% discrepancy argues for accepting the first
proposition of the study—that strategists cogni-
tively group their competitors—and rejecting the
alternative explanation that the clusters formed
are mere artifacts of a clustering technique.
Additional support for this proposition can be
found in the strong similarities among clusters in
the six cases that showed any discrepancy at all
among the methods explored.
Commonality across informants
There is also strong commonality across respon-
dents in the firms assigned to each cluster,
which supports our second proposition: grouping
schemas are not idiosyncratic, but widely shared
across strategists. Since the results were similar
across the three clustering algorithms, for clarity
of exposition analyses from the average linkage
method only are presented below.
Table 2 summarizes the number and percentage
of informants who assigned each BHC to each
of the three clusters commonly observed in the
data. Both Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 include a
core group of BHCs assigned to the same cluster
by all informants rating that company and a
secondary group of companies clustered with this
core by more than 65% of the informants. Firms
in Cluster 1 generally followed a 'money center'
strategy concentrating on wholesale and commer-
cial activities in a national or even international
market whereas firms in Cluster 2 generally were
stronger in middle market commercial, small
business and consumer banking in a more limited
geographic area. Cluster 3 does not exhibit a
core, nor as strong a secondary group, and
appears to be more of a catch-all cluster that
cannot be as meaningfully compared across
informants. For example. Boulevard Bankcorp
(BOU) and Unibancorp (UNI) are assigned most
often to this cluster, but are also found in each
of the other clusters as well.
Robustness of results
Since cluster analysis requires researcher
interpretation and is not a statistical methodology,
it is prudent to examine the robustness of results
under various assumptions. Thus, we took three
approaches to evaluating the data shown in Table
2. First, we assumed that a three cluster solution
represented common opinion about group struc-
ture in ihc industry, and asked: How often did
a given individual assign a given firm to the
'right' cluster? Table 3, which summarizes the
251 competitor assessments shown in Table 2,
indicates (on the diagonal) that in 209 instances,
or 83% of the total, individual assessments
resulted in assigning the firm to the cluster
expected if group assignments are assumed a
priori to be shared across alt industry participants.
If each informant in this study had randomly
assigned firms to groups based on the relative
sizes of the three groups, assignments would be
'successful" only 40% of the time. The difference
between the observed result and the random
expectation (which is statistically significant at
the O.(Kll level) provides strong support for the
proposition that cognitive groups are shared
among participants in an industry.
It seems reasonable to suspect, given the low
level of common assignments to Cluster 3, that
this is a residuat group which does not mirror
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Table 3. Assignment of Bank Holding Com-
panies to Clusters: Three Cluster Solution
3 groups
Cluster
1
2
3
of firms
A
87
2
5
B
5
105
5
C
11
14
17
Total
103
121
27
94 115 42 251
'outlier' firms from those in clusters. These tables
show that ambiguity about the strategies of
Boulevard Bankcorp (BOU) and Unibancorp
(UNI) occurs almost exclusively among those
who see the industry as falling into two strategic
groups. There is little ambiguity among those
who cluster the industry into three groups. They
unanimously agree that BOU belongs in Group
3, and only one individual disagrees on the
placement of UNI in Group 3.
This third view of the data suggests even more
strongly that there is considerable agreement on
the strategic location of the BHCs in the
population we studied. Commonality of group
membership is supported under three different
approaches to analyze the data, thus, proposition
two is conclusively supported.
strategic commonalities. The second test of
shared strategic groups assumed that firms
assigned to the first two clusters followed
especially clear cut strategies. The data found in
the upper left square in Table 3 summarize the
number of firms assigned to these clusters. This
inner square shows only 7 'misassignments' out
of 199 judgements made about firms belonging to
the two clear strategic groups in this industry; two
in which a firm that common wisdom said belonged
in Cluster 1 was instead assigned to Cluster 2, and
five in which a firm common wisdom assigned to
Ouster 2 was instead placed in Cluster 1.' This
test shows even stronger support for the idea that
group assignments are shared.
Further examination of the data shows more
agreement about the two frequently 'misassigned
firms' than at first appears. The approach here
was to relax the expectation that industry
participants will share one view of competitor
groupings. Tables 4 and 5 divide respondents by
the number of clusters judged to best portray
their assessments of competitors, and distinguish
' Given the strength of results showing assignments jn bolh
the three group case and the two group case, no further
evidence is really necessary to support proposition two. In
more complex cases, it might be appropriate lo compare the
observed assignment with assignment to any other cluster.
(In our case, the number of as.stgnments lo Cluster I vs.
assignments to Clusters 2 or 3: and then the number of
assignments to Cluster 2 vs. assignment to Clusters I or 3).
A phi square, which corrects for the size of the sample
(Reynolds. 1977; 27). or Cramer's V, which is particularly
useful for assessing symmetric arrays (Reynolds. 1977; 32),
can be used to describe data that are less clear eut.
Cognitive groups, performance and survival
The strong results of this study show that
cognitive data can be used to form strategic
groups. Are these groups useful for understanding
performance or other outcomes of interest? Table
6 shows the 1986 ROA for each focal BHC,
as well as whether the BHC has remained
independent or was acquired subsequent to the
study. Again, since the status of Cluster 3 as
a cohesive strategic group is in doubt, we
concentrated our analysis on the first two clusters.
Using a /-test of group mean differences for
small samples, average ROA for the two groups
was significantly different in 1986
(alpha = O.(K)5). Since many of the focal BHCs
were acquired in 1987, and thus, did not report
independent ROA figures, it is impossible to
meaningfully compare profitability differences
for later years.
However, substantial differences exist between
the two groups identified with cognitive data as
to whether the members remained independent,
or if acquired, what type of firm made the
acquisition up to 5 years after executive assess-
ments were made. In Cluster 1. both Harris and
LaSalle had been purchased by international
bank holding companies when data were collected
in 1986. Subsequent to the interviews, LaSalle's
parent, ABN, also acquired Exchange. The three
other members of this cluster have remained
independent. None of the core BHCs in Cluster 1
have changed ownership since the research was
conducted.
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Table 4. Assignment of bank holding companies to clusters by informants whose data resulted in a two
cluster solution
Bank holding companies
Informants
A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 Bl B4 CI C2 C5 C6 C7 DI D2
ABN-USalle
Affiliated
Boulevard
Cole-Tayior
Continental 111
Exchange
First Chicago
First Colonial
First Evergreen
First Illinois
First United
Gary Wheaton
Harris
Lake Shore
Northern Trust
State National
Unibancorp
USAmeribancs
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
X
I
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
I
I
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
I
1
2
X
1
1
2
2r-l
1
r-l
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
I
1
1
X
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
I
1
1
2
2
2
I
2
I
1
1
1
X
2
X
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
I
2
2
2
1
X
2
2
1
1
1
X
1
X
2
2
I
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
I
X
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
X = outlier firm
Table 5. Assignment of bank holding companies to clusters by informants whose
data resulted in a three cluster solution
Bank holding companies
ABN-LaSalle
Affiliated
Boulevard
Cole-Taylor
Continental III
Exchange
First Chicago
First Colonial
First Evergreen
First Illinois
First United
Gary Wheaton
Harris
Lake Shore
Northern Trust
State National
Unibancorp
USAmeribancs
B2
3
2
I
2
1
2
2
2
1
3
1
3
B3
3
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
3
B.S
3
2
I
3
I
2
2
2
I
3
1
2
informants
B6
3
2
1
3
I
2
2
2
1
3
1
3
C3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
2
1
3
2
2
D2
3
3
2
1
2
3
2
2
1
3
3
2
D4
3
3
2
1
3
2
2
2
I
2
3
2
D5
3
2
3
I
2
2
2
2
1
2
3
2
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Table 6. Profitability and ownership changes
Cluster I
Core Firms
First Chicago
Northern Trust
Continental Illinois
Harris
Secondary Firms
ABN-LaSalle
Exchange
Mean ROA. Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Core Firms
First Evergreen
Gary Wheaton
Affiliated
First United
USAmeribancs
State National
First Illinois
Secondary Firms
First Colonial
Cole-Taylor
Mean ROA. Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Boulevard
Lake Shore
Unibancorp
1986 ROA
0.71
0.57
0.5
0.7
0.52
0.53
0.59'
1.3
1.1
-
1.0
-
0.85
1.2
0.82
1.05
1.0
1.0
1.1
Ownership^
Independent
Independent
Independent
Bank of Montreal
Algemene Bank Nederland
Algemene Bank Nederland
Independent
First Chicago
Manufacturers (Michigan)
First Chicago
NBD Bancorp
NBD Bancorp
BancOne (Ohio)
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Old Kent Financial
'Mean ROA for Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 arc significantly different at the 0.005
level of significance using a Mest of differences between group means for small
sample sizes.
'Ownership changes which occurred after the interviews were conducted and
announced as of October I, 1991 are indicated in bold. All of the focal BHCs
were independent at the time of the study except for the following; LaSalle was
purchased by Algemene Bank Nederiand (ABN) on August 14. 1979; Harris
became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Bank of Montreal on Sept. 4,
1984; NBD Bancorp (headquarter in Michigan) announced the purchase of
USAmeribancs on October 23. 1986. Interviews were conducted in November
1986.
The BHCs in Cluster 2 have faced a quite
different fate. Five of the nine BHCs have been
acquired, all by BHCs headquartered in the
midwestern United Slates. Only one of the core
BHCs in this cluster. Evergreen, has remained
independent. The other two banks which have
remained independent in this group. First Colo-
nial and Cole Tayior, were the members most
often assigned to other clusters.
Performance at the time of data collection and
survival 5 years later thus support the cognitive
data on strategic group assignment. Firms in
Cluster 1, especially those assigned unambigu-
ously, did not change ownership. In fact, the
only member of this group that was acquired,
Exchange, followed the pattern set by other
group members—it was acquired by a foreign
bank holding company. All except one of
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the firms assigned by at least 90 percent of
respondents to Cluster 2 were acquired by
regionally-based U.S. bank holding companies
within 5 years of our analysis. TTiese results
are supportive of the other findings on the
homogeneity of firms within cognitive groups,
however, the small sample sizes and the corre-
lational nature of the analysis precludes the
assertion of a causal link between these outcomes
and strategic group membership.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Given the amount of change in the Chicago
banking market from the early 1980s on, the
support for the basic propositions of this study
is surprisingly strong, especially since respondents
used their own dimensions to describe firm
strategies rather than a common set of researcher-
supplied categories. Nonetheless, idiosyncratic
assessments in the data deserve further expla-
nation. Why were some firms unambiguously
assigned to a strategic group across informants,
while placement of other firms is more uncertain?
Further examination of the data suggest six
arguments which may explain disagreement about
strategic group membership for some firms.
These arguments address the nature of strategic
positioning as well as the ability of researchers
and competitors to perceive subtleties in the
strategic choices firms make.
1. Fuzzy Groups. Some BHCs that were not
uniformly assessed by informants may have
exhibited strategies essentially in line with those
of one or more 'core' BHCs in a particular group,
but these firms also may have shared secondary
attributes with other groups or possessed idiosyn-
cratic secondary traits. Zadeh (1965). a leading
categorization theorist, has suggested that many
conceptual categories are "fuzzy" on their bound-
aries, sueh that some members of the category arc
better examples of the category than are others.
Thus, a firm that shares many commonalities with
the category is likely to be widely perceived as a
good example of the category. A firm that shares
fewer characteristics is likely to be associated with
a wider variety of firms. Some informants might
have concentrated on core aspects of this firm's
strategy, while other informants focused on second-
ary characteristics the firm happens to share with
firms in other clusters.
2. Obscured Strategy. Disagreement among
this group of expert observers about the place-
ment of a few BHCs also may be due to the
difficulty of observing some firms' strategic
actions. Porter (1980) and others have suggested
that firms are wise to obscure their intentions in
order to gain competitive advantage. Thus, it is
likely that the strategies of some firms, either
intentionally or unintentionally, will be difficult
to interpret. Given the theoretical importance of
surprise in establishing competitive advantage,
our results are interesting not because a few
firms' strategies were difficult to identify, but
because respondents agreed on the basic strategy
of almost all firms in the population. Obscured
strategy appears to have played, at most, an
extremely limited role in this industry.
3. Firm Repositioning. Even during the most
stable periods of industry evolution, the stra-
tegies of some BHCs may be in fiux due lo
firm specific conditions such as new manage-
ment, poor past performance or firm specific
innovation. Respondents in our study might
have varied in their perceptions of such firms.
Some observers may have focused on the BHC's
old strategic position, some on current position
and some may have been oriented toward
anticipated future position.
4. Industry Realignment. Another possible
explanation for variation in the categorization of
some firms is tied to the structure of the industry
as a whole. An industry in transition, such as
the one we observed, is likely to be moving
toward a larger or smaller number of viable
group 'recipes' (Spender, 1980, 1989), or. if the
key dimensions of strategy are themselves in the
process of change, some observers may have
been more aware of this transformation than
others. Inconsistencies in the data may thus be
due to some informants reporting an 'old"
structure, while others anticipate a new industry
structure. Though similar in effect to internally
motivated repositioning of individual firms, indus-
try realignment is conceptually different because
it is more closely tied to external environmental
change.
3. Reactors and Misfits. Some companies do
not follow clear, constant strategies. Such firms
have been described as 'stuck in the middle'
(Porter, 1980) or 'reactors' (Miles and Snow,
1978); they change strategic direction often or
simply react to environmental events as they
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occur. These firms might be best described as
misfits in that they do not exhibit a coherent
strategic pattern over time. It is not surprising
that industry observers vary in the way they
describe such firms.
6. Strategic Idiosyncracy. Some focal BHCs
may have adopted strategies which are so
dramatically different from all others in the
industry that it is not easy to position them v'(.s-
a-vis other firms along common dimensions.
These firms are not aligned with other firms;
they do not compete in similar ways. Such firms
may have a coherent strategy and that strategy
may fit the industry, but it does not fit the
cognitive map that usefully describes almost all
other competitors within the industry. When
Timex first entered the watch industry, it was
misaligned in this way. Its strategy was so radically
different from existing watch manufacturers that
it could not be meaningfully mapped on dimen-
sions which differentiated other competitors.
New dimensions, and hence a new map, were
needed. Lack of consensus among industry
observers may indicate analogous outliers in the
Chicago banking market.
These arguments are complementary, not
mutually exclusive. Multiple explanations appear
to account for disagreements about the placement
of all six equivocal firms in our study. For
example, the banking industry was undergoing a
major realignment at the time data were collected
for this study (McKinsey and Company, 1985).
Several informants indicated both Lake Shore
and Boulevard were pursuing strategies that were
radically different from other bank holding
companies at this time. ABN-LaSalle. on the
other hand, was often described as both a misfit
and a firm with a 'fuzzy" strategic position. This
firm had been acquired twice in the 7 years
preceding the study. It had long operated under
a consistent strategy which aligned it with firms
in Cluster 1, and at the time of the study it
retained strengths associated with that strategy.
New ownership had moved the company toward
strategies more distant from either Cluster 1 or
2, but decisions in the 1986 time frame were
interpreted by some observers as reasserting a
strategy in line with Cluster I. The lack of
agreement about the association of ABN-LaSalle
across informants appears to be a good indicator
of genuine uncertainty about the strategic direc-
tion of this firm.
A BROADENED THEORY OF
STRATEGIC GROUPS
While there is some ambiguity in the current
iiterature about the ontological status of strategic
groups, with the skeptic position expressed
especially by Hatten and Hatten (1987) and
Barney and Hoskisson (1990), our study suggests
that strategic groups are readily perceived by
strategists. The study thus provides evidence
that strategic groups are more than analytical
conveniences used by researchers; they are part
of the way strategists organize and make sense of
their competitive environment. The performance
differences between Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 at
the time of the study as well as the utility
of these groups for differentiating acquisition
experience 5 years after data collection suggest
promising avenues for future research. Explaining
performance was not the foeus of the current
research and these results, although suggestive,
do not establish a causal link between group
membership and outcomes. Nonetheless, the
strategic groups derived from the cognitive
structure of strategists in this industry demon-
strate that executive perceptions have real poten-
tial for competitive strategy research. Further,
the results contribute to evidence from previous
empirical studies using different methods (Porac
et al., 1989; Porac et al, 1987). Accumulating
evidence suggests that strategic groups are
phenomena with an ontoiogical status; they are
not the contrivance of a single method. This is
particularly important as industry level groupings,
such as those based on SIC eode assignments,
become more and more tenuous.
Disagreement on strategic group assignment
for some firms suggests, however, that future
research might benefit from a revised view
of strategic group structure. Existing research
implicitly assumes that all firms follow a strategy,
that this strategy is knowable by outsiders, and
that all firms can be assigned unambiguously to
a strategic group (even if the group has only one
member). Few of the studies reviewed by Cool
(1985) or by McGee and Thomas (1986) removed
even a single firm from the analysis due to
interpretability problems (Hatten, Schendel and
Cooper, 1978, is an exception). The results of
this study support the existence of strategic group
structure, but suggest several ways in which
current conceptualizations could be enriched.
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1. Every firm does not have to have a strategic
position. The overwhelming majority of inform-
ants in our study classified two-thirds of the BHCs
into one of two strategic clusters. Agreement was
lower for the other 6 firms in the population.
Three firms (Boulevard Bankcorp, Lake Shore
Bankcorp and Unibancorp) appear in all three
clusters and, at the least, do not appear to be
following a widely agreed upon strategy. A
distinction must be made between strategic
situation, which characterizes the unique environ-
mental and internal circumstances challenging
every firm, and strategic position, which charac-
terizes the firm's response to those circumstances.
Every firm faces a strategic situation. These data,
however, suggest that the largely unexamined
assumption of existing strategic group theory,
that every firm has a strategic position, may be
true for only some firms in the industry. The
competitive positions of at least some firms are
not easily assessed and/or readily assigned to a
strategic group. When strategy is conceptualized
a.s a pattern over time (Mintzberg, 1978), it is
quite likely that some firms do not have a
coherent strategy. Including such firms will
diminish the usefulness of studies observing
strategic position.
One particularly interesting implication of
this argument for future research is that past
correlational studies might be usefully re-exam-
ined. For example, the ambiguous results of
studies attempting to link strategic group member-
ship to profitability seem to have brought this
line of inquiry to an impasse. If problematic
firms are removed from group assignments, it is
possible that more conclusive results could be
achieved.
2. Group membership is a matter of degree.
Strategic groups were 'fuzzy sets' when aggregated
across informants in this study. A more fine-
grained view of membership within groups might
be profitable for many strategic group studies.
Our results suggest that a strategic group might
be best conceptualized as a core group of firms
that define the group position and secondary
firms that are aligned with core firms in many
essential respects, though they also make some
unique strategic decisions. Porter (1980: 154)
implicitly acknowledges the possibility of ambigu-
ously defined groups when he advises analysts
to draw many strategic group maps using different
dimensions depending upon the analyst's pur-
poses. However, no published empirical work
has yet taken this approach.
The general point worth considering is that
some firms are prototypical of a group's position,
while others are not. Categorization theorists
label this phenomenon 'membership gradience'
(Berlin and Kay, 1969; Zadeh, 1965). However,
it is also probable that the firms included in a
particular analysis will determine which firms are
core and which are secondary (Lakoff, 1987). A
map of the financial services industry (Fombrun
and Zajac. 1987) provides different results than
one which includes commercial banks only
(Passmore, 1985). Reger (199()a) pursues the
ramifications of this point for the design of
competitive positioning research.
3. Some groups may be tightly associated
while others are more diverse. One interesting
observation on the pattern of cluster formation
from our dala analysis is that some firms are
rapidly linked by clustering algorithms while
others lie at greater distance and are incorporated
into a group much later in the clustering
procedure. The implication is that some firms in
an industry are quite similar while others,
though associated, are more disparate. Studies
of performance, and other potential correlates
of group membership, again might benefit from
distinguishing 'tight' and 'loose" groups.
4. Overlapping group membership may charac-
terize some industries. Our data suggest that
strategic groups may be overlapping at their
periphery, with a small set of firms sharing some
strategic characteristics with one group and other
strategic characteristics with another. While this
possibility muddies the ideas of symmetry and
simplification that are basic attractions of the
strategic groups idea, allowing overlap may be
necessary if we wish to more realistically map
complex industries. The existence of overlap also
raises some interesting research questions. Firms
at the intersection of two existing groups may
indicate a potentially viable location for new
group formation, for example, or they may
represent the problem of literally being 'stuck in
the middle' (Porter, 1980).
5. For periods of time, group structure may
not exist or may not be apparent. Cool (1985)
and Fiegenbaum (1987) identify stable strategic
time periods in an industry by stable strategic
group membership. Taking the previous sugges-
tions (1 through 4) to an extreme, it may be
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necessary to allow not only for shifting group
membership between stable time periods, but
for periods in which an industry can not be
usefully defined in terms of strategic group
structure at all. Mintzberg (1978) suggests that
firms often go through periods of inchoate
search before establishing a strategic direction
or redirection. The same may be true for
industries as a whole. Economic conditions can
be in such flux that firms will not be able to
follow consistent strategies, and. as firms change
position this movement will tend to further
destabilize the industry. However, we expected
less stability in this study of bank holding
companies than we found. Even in a period of
uncertainty and search for new strategies—like
the one that currently characterizes the banking
industry—it may be that similar firms muddle in
similar ways and the strategic groups idea remains
useful.
In summary, based on our findings from the
bank study, we propose that strategic group
structure be reconceptualized as graphically
depicted in Figure 1. This figure provides a
general picture of strategic groups composed of
the following kinds of firms:
- Core firms that are tightly associated and
define the basic 'recipe' of a strategic group.
- Secondary Group Members that implement
the strategic group recipe less consistently
than core firms.
- Transient firms whose strategies are changing
from one strategic position to another, but
along dimensions common to other firms in
the industry.
Left out of this schematic are two kinds of firms:
- Misfit firms whose strategies are inconsistent
over time.
- Idiosyncratic firms whose strategies cannot
be easily expressed in terms of the key strategic
dimensions used to define the competitive
positions of most firms in the industry.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
If strategic group membership is reconceptualized
as a matter of degree, a number of interesting
research possibilities become available.
^ P Core Rrms
C_J Secondary Firms
\^-—^^- Cj Transient Firms
Misfits and Idiosyncratic Firms (inappropriate lo map)
Figure 1. A reconceptualization of strategic group
relationships
1. Strategic groups research provides an oppor-
tunity to look more closely at viable strategic
alternatives. If groups are defined solely on
dimensions associated with the core members
of the group, clearer insights into strategic
alternatives may be forthcoming. Deviation from
the core might indicate either inability to
implement the group recipe completely or deliber-
ate attempts to differentiate the firm from core
members. The distinction between imitabiiity
and differentiation might be addressed more
directly by distinguishing core and secondary
firm characteristics.
2. Intragroup dissimilarities may be clarified
by exploring the roles different types of firms play
in industry dynamics. For instance, the extent to
which core firms serve as referents for other
members or tend to be first movers are promising
research avenues. We hypothesize that core firms
will vary in terms of innovativeness, but that
they will serve as key referents and tend to
dominate external views of the industry.
Transients, misfits and idiosyncratic firms may
provide important clues as to future strategic
options or necessities in an industry, and are
therefore Important to those interested in industry
evolution and competitive dynamics (Lewin and
Minton, 1986). From a population ecology
perspective, these firms may represent the 'gene
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pool' for future variation in response to new
conditions; they provide some evidence as to
what may be more or less attractive positions in
the future. These firms provide the counterbal-
ance to what can be learned from core firms.
Core firms reflect the current consensus of
opinion about viable modes of operating within
an industry context; outlier firms suggest future
possibilities. This evidence is especially important
as exogenous forces impinge upon the industry
or powerful competitors change the nature of
competitive dynamics within the industry.
3. Attention should be directed at more valid
methods for determining group membership and
structure. Valid strategic groups should account
for outcomes of interest in strategic management
such as strategic choice and performance. Our
results tentatively suggest that cognitively-derived
strategic groups are promising for exploring
performance outcomes and independent survival
in a consolidating industry. More research should
focus on the usefulness of strategic groups for
predicting other strategic outcomes. One focus
of this inquiry might be on the relationships
between 'competitive' groups (firms that compete
against each other) and "strategic* groups (firms
that compete using similar strategies). The
interaction between changes in strategic po-
sitioning as perceived by managers and changes
evident in 'objective' data is also an alluring
research area. Under what conditions do mana-
gerial perceptions lead, or lag, economic and
financial indicators of changing positions?
4. The study of cognitive strategic groups can
enrich the theory of how analytically identified
groups form and why they tend to remain
stable. We suggest that the 'analytic' strategic
groups formed by observable variations in
accounting and financial data (Cool, 1985; Fiegen-
baum, 1987) owe their regularities, at least in
part, to the process of enactment (Weick, 1979).
It is reasonable to expect that the groups
managers perceive will have real effects on
strategy reformulation, strategic action and sub-
sequently on industry structure. Economic reali-
ties make strategic similarities likely, but cognitive
processes also may be expected to reinforce
economic influences and thus help maintain the
existing group structure. As Pfeffer and Salancik
note, "environments are not given realities, but
created through a process of attention and
Interpretation' (1978: 13). Enactment of strategic
groups may be aided by several processes
including simplification, elaboration, interaction,
borrowed experience, and expectations. In aggre-
gate, these processes provide the mechanisms
whereby cognitive and economic realities con-
verge.
The effect of cognitive simplification, we
suggest, is not just that strategists will tend to
think of competitors in clusters, but that they
will tend to recognize similarities between their
own firm and a set of fellow firms and act
accordingly. While the link between thought and
action remains problematic in social science
research, most strategy researchers assume some
connection. It then follows that cognitive simpli-
fication should contribute to simplification of
action. As firms recognize links between them-
selves and others, and act based on these apparent
simplifications, groupings of firms within an
industry will tend to become even more distinct.
Cognitive elaboration, the process which cre-
ates information about competitors, may also
lead to the enactment of strategic groups. To
the extent strategists find similarities between
their firm and others, and act upon these
similarities, they can create further alignment in
economic realities. For example, if firm A
believes its competitor B faces similar production
capacity constraints (whether this is true or not),
it may monitor and react to B's capacity expansion
decisions in a number of ways that work to fulfill
that expectation. If B begins to act as if it might
increase its capacity (by initiating exploratory
studies, for example), A may begin to contem-
plate a similar move that it had not here-to-fore
considered. Firm A interprets B's actions in a
way that leads it to imitate B's strategy. A's
assumption of the need for competitive reaction
thus serves to bring the two firms' strategies into
closer alignment. Our point, again, is that
perceived similarities, whether or not they accu-
rately reflect reality initially, channel actions into
a smaller number of alternatives than might
otherwise be the case and strategic groups are
likely to further coalesce.
Likewise, interaction among strategists and
with industry analysts, distributors and other
third parties tends to result in similar thought
patterns (Porac et ai, 1989). Executive fraterni-
zation makes it more likely that firms will react
in similar ways to threats and opportunities
within the industry—further clustering firms.
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While shared information and interpretation
are expected to promote similar decisions, cogni-
tive clustering is even more likely when strategists
'borrow experience' through observing other
firms in the industry as a substitution for direct
experimentation with strategic alternatives (Huff,
1982). As firms experience success and failure.
Iheir actions will tend to be copied and/or
avoided by others in the industry. Over time we
expect this process of replication and circumven-
tion to make a major contribution to clustering
firms within an industry.
As strategists scrutinize other firms within an
industry and develop mental frameworks for
interpreting what they see. they come to expect
certain behavior and act on these expectations.
Expectations thus are another force for chan-
neling firms into a limited repertoire of behavior.
If a firm is classified as aggressive, for instance,
small changes in its pricing policy will be given
increased importance and retaliatory responses
are more likely. Similar actions by another firm.
perceived to be following a less aggressive path,
will be taken less seriously. Such expectations
exist not only among competitors, but among
buyers, suppliers and potential entrants. The
result, particularly given limited ability to make
distinctions among firms due to cognitive over-
load, is to further homogenize both the perception
of strategic options within an industry and the
repertoire of strategic actions taken.
LIMITS TO COGNITIVE GROUP
RESEARCH
In our view, these are strong arguments for
assuming that strategists' cognitive structures will
have a material effect on strategic choices. As
choices channelled by managerial perception
contribute to the economic structure of ;m
industry, the external stimulus for future percep-
tions of similarity are further reinforced. In
other words, cognitive groups tend to reinforce
economic groups. They combine with forces at
other levels that create institutional isomorphism
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
The spiral of mutual reinforcement should be
halanced by evolutionary changes in technology,
buyer demographics and so on. along with the
declining profitability of overpopulated strategic
positions. These evolutionary agents force firms
to change their strategies and break groups apart,
Research shows, however, that established mental
maps lead individuals to ignore contradictory
data (e.g., Prahalad and Bettis, 198ft). Thus a
problem with cognitive associations is they may
not reflect evidence from a changing world.
Cognitive structures also are inevitably based on
incomplete knowledge, and even the simplest
inferences are frequently biased (Schwenk, 1984).
These limitations on the accuracy of managerial
perceptions limit the research utility of managerial
ohservations in general, and cognitive strategic
groups in particular, but they do not justify
abandoning cognitive data. In our view, strategy
researchers interested in competitive interaction
should treat participants in an industry as expert
witnesses and important sources of data. Many
biases and limitations can be mitigated, if not
canceled, by broadly seeking opinions among
industry participants. Furthermore, accounting
and financial data have their own categorization
and reporting biases that might be more easily
seen when compared with the categorizations of
industry participants.
Our results must be interpreted with caution
since the study focuses on only one geographic
area of one industry. The banking industry
in Chicago was facing unique environmental
challenges stemming primarily from state deregu-
lation. Thus, future research will be necessary
to determine the generalizability of these results
to other industries facing other environmental
conditions. Another limitation has to do with
the small number of informants; the intensive
interviewing needed to collect rich data neces-
sarily limits cognitive studies. Future research
might be usefully directed to the optimal number
of subjects necessary to establish a "cognitive
community' (Porac et al.. 1989). Again, further
research is required to examine these generaliz-
ability issues.
CONCLUSION
Strategic groups offer a promising way to
summarize competitors' strategies in industries
populated by so many competitors that individual
consideration of each firm is imptissible. This
study theoretically argues and finds empirically
that even in a changing industry strategists
cognitively group their competitors' strategies.
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In fact, there is strong uniformity across our
sample of informants in the grouping of almost
all 18 firms studied. These groups accurately
predicted subsequent performance differences
and acquisition patterns.
Managers group firms in subtle ways not
captured by economically oriented research.
If more subtle distinctions in strategic group
membership along the lines shown in Figure 1
are identified, we believe new utility in the
strategic group concept may emerge. Even more
interesting, in our view, is the potential of a
refined concept of strategic groups for further
understanding competitive positioning. What are
the differences between core and secondary
group members? Are there barriers to mobility
even within groups? How will firms perceived as
following aspects of more ihan one strategy fare?
Are they stuck in the middle or are they
developing a new and viable niche? Once
questions of positioning like these become the
focus for research, it becomes more and more
interesting lo include practitioners as a source of
data on strategic groups. The fact that we found
such strong consensus among informants, even
in a rapidly changing industry, suggests (hat
practitioners can be a reliable and valid source
of data. The apparent ability of these observers to
capture nuances in association among compclitors
over time suggests that this dala can considerably
enrich archival studies.
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APPENDIX
This appendix lists examples of the dimensions
elicited in the interviews. In all, 331 dimensions
were elicited, or approximately 13 per informant.
The dimensions presented here have been
grouped together by categories agreed upon by
three raters. The numbers in parentheses indicate
the percentage of informants who provided
dimensions in that category (only those categories
where at least 25 percent of informants gave
dimensions are presented).
Every informant provided at least one idiosyn-
cratic dimension (92 of the 331 dimensions or 28
percent of the total). Some examples of dimen-
sions provided by only one informant are 'ethnic
clientele vs. broad based clientele.* "supptirts
liberalized branching laws vs. unit banks,' and
'interested in buying savings and loans vs. not
interested in buying savings and loans.' Additional
information on procedures for categorizing the
dimensions and results of the dimension level
analysis are available from the first author.
Geographic Scope (88% of informants)
national market vs. local strategy
international presence vs. no international
presence
Target Market: Lending (88%)
money center, wholesale vs. retail operation
middle market vs. retail, small business
Growth Strategies (79%)
planned expansion through acquisition vs.
internal development
growth vs. retrenchment and survival were
major concerns
Location (71%)
downtown area vs. suburban operation
loop area competitors vs. suburban banks
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Management (63%)
ability to implement strategic focus vs. nonstra-
tegically focused
average management capabilities vs. high man-
agement capabilities
HC Structure and Management (58%)
unit bank vs. multibank holding company
'federal approach': collection of banks vs.
centralized
Trust (54%)
strong trust department vs. no trust depart-
ment
trust department important (commercial and
retail) vs. personal trust only
ProdtwtlMarket Scope (42%)
broad range of financial services vs. focused
on a niche
full service banks vs. limited services
Successful Company (29%)
good earnings performers vs. poor earnings
performance
control overhead vs, not careful with overhead
Ownership and Control (25%)
public ownership vs. private ownership
independently owned and managed by owners
vs. managers don t control
Asset Based Lending (25%)
asset based lenders vs. unsecured lending
asset based lending important to strategy vs.
asset based lending not important to strategy

